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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Nanotechnology is emerging as a tool that will increasingly change the 
way that scientists approach the world.  While a subject matter or a mode of 
inquiry defines traditional scientific fields, an inquiry of a microscopic level 
advancement defines nanotechnology.1  Because of this broad definition, 
nanotechnology encompasses a wide array of technologies that exist at that 
scale.2  Advances in nanoparticles and nanorobotics are already altering 
conceptions of surgery, mechanization, and construction.3  Materials that 
emerge from the field could soon be ubiquitous in worldwide technology, 
and scientists promise further advances.4   
Against this promising background, it is easy to overlook the dangers that 
nanotechnology presents.  Nanoparticles interact unpredictably and 
unprecedentedly with the human body.5  Nanorobots may soon possess the 
ability to create new nanorobots or even to replicate themselves many times 
over.6   
These technologies, if managed negligently, could lead to catastrophic 
accidents.  If intentionally weaponized, they could represent a paradigm shift 
in warfare.  Because of its difficulty to trace, its unpredictability, its capacity 
for grave biological harm, its potential ability to infiltrate technological 
systems, and its possible ability to self-replicate in the future, 
nanotechnology could contribute to devastating new weapons.7  These 
weapons could contribute to massive human rights violations, both because 
of the numbers of people they could endanger and the horrific types of 
damage they could inflict.8 
The international community needs an effective deterrent to both 
governments and individual actors that seek to weaponize nanotechnology.  
It also needs a reliable system for prosecuting these crimes in the future and 
a cognizable set of crimes that accurately captures the potential harms of 
weaponized nanotechnology.   
                                                                                                                                                       
 1 Wei Zhou, Ethics of Nanobiotechnology at the Frontline, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 481, 482 (2003). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Oak Ridge Nat’l Lab., Nanotechnology Overview, ADVANCED MATERIALS & PROCESSES, 
May 2000, at 48. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See Hitoshi Nasu & Thomas Faunce, Nanotechnology and the International Law of 
Weaponry: Towards International Regulation of Nano-Weapons, 20 J.L. INF. & SCI. 21, 27 
(2010) (describing the difficulty in treating physical injuries sustained as the result of 
nanoparticles because of their unpredictability). 
 6 Vasily E. Tarasov, Quantum Nanotechnology, 8 INT’L J. NANOSCIENCE 337, 337 (2009). 
 7 Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5.   
 8 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the biological effects of weaponization). 
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The International Criminal Court (ICC) already has procedures for 
addressing the sorts of crimes that these technologies could enable.  Rather 
than developing a new framework and yet another regulatory body to govern 
the technology, the ICC could fold nanotechnology crimes into the existing 
provisions of the Rome Statute.  Specifically, the crime of aggression should 
contain language that addresses nanotechnology.  These provisions should be 
capable of addressing both state-sanctioned military development and 
individual deployment of this weapon technology.  The adoption of such 
provisions would speak to a global consensus that the international 
community will not tolerate the misuse of nanotechnology. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  What is Nanotechnology? 
1.  The Technology Itself 
In 1959, Richard Feynman presented a speech entitled There’s Plenty of 
Room at the Bottom: An Invitation to Enter a New World of Physics.9  In it, 
he posed a question to the audience: “Why cannot we write the entire 24 
volumes of the Encyclopedia [Britannica] on the head of a pin?”10  He asked 
the question to stimulate the crowd’s imagination and to demonstrate that 
physics was not thinking small enough.11  Feynman stated that someday in 
the future, scientists would be able to build structures a single atom at a time, 
affording scientists a greater degree of control over the structures produced 
than ever before.12  He proposed that this new technology would have 
applications across scientific fields, and in particular, he singled out biology 
as a beneficiary of the ability to enhance structures on the atomic level.13  He 
even articulated primitive versions of techniques that scientists use today.14  
Though Feynman had never heard the word “nanotechnology,” and indeed, 
                                                                                                                                                       
 9 Richard Feynman, There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom: An Invitation to Enter a New 
World of Physics (Dec. 29, 1959), in 23:5 CALTECH ENGINEERING AND SCI. 22, 22 (Feb. 1960), 
available at http://www.calteches.library.caltech.edu/47/2/1960Bottom.pdf. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Luca Escoffier, A Brief Review of Nanotechnology Funding and Patenting in Japan, 4 
NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 101, 102 (2007). 
 12 Feynman, supra note 9, at 34. 
 13 See id. at 24 (citing better electron microscopes developed through nanotechnology as 
aiding the field of biology). 
 14 Id. (“Why can’t we manufacture these small computers somewhat like we manufacture 
the big ones? Why can’t we drill holes, cut things, solder things, stamp things out, mold 
different shapes all at an infinitesimal level?”). 
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the term itself had yet to be coined, he was effectively describing the 
nanotechnology revolution. 
Nanotechnology’s definition is amorphous.  Some scholars define it as 
research involving the manipulation of structures that takes place on the scale 
of one or several nanometers.15  This definition is scientifically unusual 
because areas of interest define scientific branches rather than artificially-
denoted scales of focus.16 
An alternative definition of nanotechnology is “the investigation of novel 
properties that manifest themselves at [nanometer] scale, and of the ability to 
manipulate and artificially construct structures at that scale.”17  Regardless of 
preferred definitional characteristics, nanotechnology offers the ability to 
manipulate individual atoms to effectuate more complex and efficient 
structures than otherwise possible.18 
Nanotechnology can be approached “top-down” or “bottom-up.”19  In a 
top-down approach, scientists seek to whittle down at a macro-sized structure 
until all that is left is an atomic arrangement.20  In the bottom-up approach, 
however, scientists actually create conditions that induce atoms to form 
desired structures of their own volition.21 
Carbon nanotubes provide an example of such a bottom-up process.  
Scientists fire lasers at a graphite pellet, releasing an intense stream of atoms.  
They subject this stream to an array of hot and cold gases calculated to 
induce the atoms into hexagonal shapes; the resulting “tubes” are 
exceptionally strong and light.22   
2.  Growth of Nanotechnology 
The field of nanotechnology is growing worldwide at a staggering rate.  
Global funding topped $4 billion in 2005 and has since increased.23  
Militaries are avidly researching nanotechnology; the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Russia, and India are all turning to 
nanotechnology as a potentially useful area of combat research.24  The 
                                                                                                                                                       
 15 Oak Ridge Nat’l Lab., supra note 3.  A nanometer is one-billionth of a meter. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Ronald N. Kostoff, Raymond G. Koytcheff & Clifford G.Y. Lau, Global Nanotechnology 
Research Literature Overview, 74 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 1733, 1734 
(2007). 
 18 Oak Ridge Nat’l Lab., supra note 3. 
 19 Escoffier, supra note 11, at 102. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Oak Ridge Nat’l Lab., supra note 3. 
 23 Escoffier, supra note 11, at 102. 
 24 Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5, at 23. 
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United States military alone spent almost $400 million in 2010 on 
nanotechnology.25  In the private sphere, the United States has issued over 
4,400 patents for nanotechnology-related innovations.26   
B.  Positive Applications 
In the minds of many academics, nanotechnology’s promise is nearly 
limitless.  Fields that are frequently mentioned as beneficiaries of the 
technology include medicine and mechanical engineering.  Medical 
applications include drug delivery systems and microsurgery.27  
Nanoparticles could be engineered to enter the body and bloodstream more 
effectively in order to more quickly and completely administer 
pharmaceuticals.28   
The prospect of microscopic nanorobots, capable of both self-replication 
and self-guidance, offers new opportunities for microsurgery.  Such devices 
could even theoretically be delivered via viruses.29  “Regenerative 
medicine”30 is another eventual microsurgical promise, with nano-robots 
capable of tissue regeneration and engineering able to target microscopic 
flaws in damaged tissue and repair it to a degree modern surgery cannot.31 
Nanotechnology also promises significant improvements in electronics 
and mechanical engineering.  In the United States, medical nanotechnology 
patent grants are declining as a proportion of total patents granted, while the 
percentage of electronic nanotechnology patents has increased 
dramatically.32  Applications include the creation of new fuel cells in which 
nano-structures efficiently regulate proton exchange across cells, thereby 
avoiding the energy loss usually associated with the exchange.33  Carbon 
nanotubes, noted for their toughness and lightness, could have an immediate 
                                                                                                                                                       
 25 Id. at 25. 
 26 Blaise Mouttet, Nanotechnology and U.S. Patents: A Statistical Analysis, 3 
NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 309, 310 (2006). 
 27 Zhou, supra note 1, at 481; see also Nikhil Mali et al., Carbon Nanotubes as Carriers for 
Delivery of Bioactive and Theraputic Agents: An Overview, 3 INT’L J. PHARMACY & 
PHARMACEUTICAL SCI. 1 (2011) (discussing modifications that would allow carbon nanotubes 
to move through cell walls to deliver pharmaceuticals). 
 28 Zhou, supra note 1, at 484. 
 29 Id. at 485. 
 30 Escoffier, supra note 11, at 103. 
 31 Zhou, supra note 1, at 483. 
 32 Mouttet, supra note 26, at 312. 
 33 Oak Ridge Nat’l Lab., supra note 3. 
728  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 41:723 
 
impact on dozens of manufacturing industries,34 a significant prospect 
considering the increasing application of current products like carbon fiber.35 
C.  Weaponization and Potential Drawbacks 
For all the potential benefits of nanotech, its power presents significant 
risks.  Hitoshi Nasu and Robert Pinson have pointed out the potentially 
catastrophic damage that nanotechnology could do if negligently 
mismanaged or intentionally weaponized.36  The lack of an international 
regulatory structure compounds the risk of an unintentional catastrophe.37  
Furthermore, no defined framework exists for punishing either state or 
individual actors who intentionally misuse nanotech.  The lack of a coherent 
strategy for punishment will present increasing problems as scientific 
advances increase nanotech’s potential abilities.38  
1.  Biological Effects of Weaponization 
The effects of a weapon engineered using actual nanotechnology could be 
catastrophic.39  Indeed, the effects of available proto-nanotechnology are 
already severe.40   
For example, the Israeli army has developed and deployed the Dense Inert 
Metal Explosive (DIME), an explosive device that scatters microparticles of 
shrapnel at intense heat and speed.41  Microparticles, precursors to 
nanotechnology, have made these weapons possible because weapons 
designers can better control the shrapnel that such devices emit, and that 
shrapnel is increasingly deadly.42  The result of this proto-nano-weapon 
                                                                                                                                                       
 34 Id. 
 35 Stephen Trimble, Lockheed Martin Reveals F-35 to Feature Nanocomposite Structures, 
FLIGHTGLOBAL (May 26, 2011), http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/lockheed-martin-rev 
eals-f-35-to-feature-nanocomposite-357223 (describing Lockheed Martin’s consideration of the 
replacement of over 100 components of F-35 fighter aircraft with a “thermoset epoxy reinforced 
by carbon nanotubes”); Carbon Fiber Racing Car Parts, RIVERS CARBON, http://www.riverscar 
bon.com/carbon-fiber-race-car-parts (last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (describing advances in carbon 
fiber production and resulting increases in joint accuracy within cars); Ann M. Thayer, Carbon 
Nanotubes by the Metric Ton, 85 CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS 29 (Nov. 12, 2007), available 
at http://pubs.acs.org/email/cen/html/112207102848.html (describing the increasing use of 
carbon nanotubes in commercial industries and projecting future commercial uses of such tubes). 
 36 See generally infra Section II.C.1–3 (discussing weaponization and potential drawbacks). 
 37 See generally infra Section II.C.1–3 (discussing weaponization and potential drawbacks). 
 38 See generally Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5. 
 39 Robert D. Pinson, Is Nanotechnology Prohibited By the Biological and Chemical 
Weapons Conventions?, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 279, 281 (2004).   
 40 See id. at 280–81. 
 41 Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5, at 22. 
 42 Id. 
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reveals the dangers of future weapons—the microparticles of shrapnel are 
nearly impossible for doctors to remove from the target of the weapon 
because there is nothing for them to essentially grab on to.43   
The prospect of a DIME-style weapon that incorporates nanoparticles 
becomes more terrifying with the emergence of research as to the effects of 
these nanoparticles on biological systems.  Even carbon nanotubes, which 
are designed for inherently peaceful, industrial purposes, are biologically 
devastating.44  Studies have shown that they become lodged in the lungs and 
are nearly impossible for the body to break down because of their unique 
structure and tiny size.45  The particles can eventually cause suffocation.46 
A device that forces shrapnel into the skin, like the DIME device, would 
not be necessary to effectively weaponize nanoparticles because these 
particles can be inhaled.47  Once they enter the bloodstream, they are 
theoretically capable of directly infiltrating the brain.48  The nanoparticles 
can use body systems and pathways that typical biological pathogens cannot.  
For example, nanoparticles can travel along the olfactory nerves after 
inhalation.  Even if they are kept out of the bloodstream, they may still be 
capable of infiltrating the brain.49 
The ease with which nanoparticles can enter the body, the bloodstream, 
and the brain is made worse by the difficulties encountered in treating their 
effects.  Nanoparticles trigger oxidative stress, and “cationic [nanoparticles] 
have an immediate toxic effect at the blood-brain barrier.”50  These 
immediate and severe consequences are difficult to diagnose in time to 
counteract their effects.  Nanomaterials can be “more chemically reactive” 
than normal particles.51  They have a higher ratio of surface area to total area 
because of their small size and the precise structures to which they are 
engineered.52  Nanoparticles actually are so small that their movements and 
interactions with surrounding particles are partially governed by the laws of 
quantum mechanics, which are inherently unpredictable.53 
                                                                                                                                                       
 43 Id. 
 44 Pinson, supra note 39, at 280–81.   
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 L. James Valverde, Jr. & Igor Linkov, Nanotechnology: Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management Perspective, 8 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 25, 26 (2011). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Masami Matsuda & Geoffrey Hunt, Research on the Societal Impacts of 
Nanotechnology: A Preliminary Comparison of USA, Europe and Japan, 19 BIO-MED. 
MATERIALS & ENGINEERING 259, 260 (2009). 
 51 Valverde & Linkov, supra note 47, at 30. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id.; see also Tarasov, supra note 6, at 338 (“The impossibility of ideally copying (or 
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Nanoparticles vary wildly in their individual reactions to the same stimuli 
because of their tiny scale, individual engineering, chemical reactivity, and 
subsequent interactivity with the laws of quantum mechanics.54  A necessary 
first step for managing a public health crisis is making an accurate 
identification of the toxin, pathogen, or other catalyst causing the crisis.55  
However, without advance knowledge of the specific nanoparticle in 
question, the “immediate toxic effect” that Matsuda and Hunt describe could 
devastate a community before officials could react.56   
The EPA’s current modeling methods for predicting and containing 
environmental crises incorporate “probabilistic modeling” and “predictive 
structure-activity analysis.”57  However, the fragmented structure of 
nanoparticles and the enormous variability among them makes them resistant 
to these very analyses.58  Because such models assume predictable structures 
on a molecular level, they cannot account for the altered molecular makeup 
of some nanoparticles.  If malevolent actors deploy nano-weapons, the 
current public health response plan would not be sufficient to combat the 
crisis. 
Experts in the emergency response field are expressing these concerns 
about modern nanoparticles such as carbon nanotubes.  As new nanoparticles 
are developed, their specialization and complexity will only increase.  The 
implications for intentional weaponization of these particles are stark, given 
their unpredictability.  A DIME-like shrapnel device incorporating 
nanoparticles instead of microparticles and intentionally distributing different 
kinds of nanoparticles with different chemical reactions could present a 
public health nightmare. 
2.  Difficulty of Controlling Self-replicating Devices 
In addition to concerns about the present biological effects of 
nanoparticles, the future development of nanotechnology presents another 
danger.  In 1977, a physicist named K. Eric Drexler proposed that not only 
could scientists create and program robots on a nano-scale, but that those 
nano-robots could be programmed to construct and train future nano-
                                                                                                                                                       
cloning) an unknown quantum state is one of the basic rules of quantum mechanics . . . . The 
no-cloning theorem tells us that cloning quantum machines cannot work ideally.”). 
 54 Valverde & Linkov, supra note 47, at 30–31. 
 55 Id.; WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, MANUAL FOR THE PUBLIC HEALTH MANAGEMENT OF 
CHEMICAL INCIDENTS 10 (2009). 
 56 Matsuda & Hunt, supra note 50, at 260. 
 57 Valverde & Linkov, supra note 47, at 32. 
 58 Id. at 31. 
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robots.59  These nano-robots capable of fabricating similar machines are 
popularly called “assemblers.”60  Pinson notes that these assemblers are 
likely years from becoming a reality.61  However, there are already products 
utilizing the benefits of nanotechnology, and the informatics, pharmaceutical, 
energy, and defense industries are investing heavily in research and 
development.62 
Replicator nano-robots are the next logical step after assembler nano-
robots.  Vasily E. Tarasov, a quantum physicist at Moscow State University, 
believes that quantum replicating nano-robots are possible and will 
eventually be a reality.63  Even outside of the quantum field, experts discuss 
replicators as a legitimate possibility.64   
The basic theory of replicators is that the nano-robots could not only be 
trained to follow orders in the process of creating new nano-robots like 
assemblers, but also could actually automatically generate more and more 
copies of themselves.65  These replicator nanorobots would theoretically be 
able to reproduce at a geometric rate.66  The weaponization of replicator 
robots is a frightening thought.  Because existing nanoparticles already carry 
formidable biological effects, the cascade effect of replicators that can 
manipulate nanotech is deeply troubling. 
3.  State or Individual?  How to Punish Dissimilar Actors for Deployment 
of Weaponized Nanotechnology  
The current dispersal of nanotechnology raises further difficulties in 
preventing weaponization: (1) the threat of a non-state actor weaponizing the 
technology, and (2) the uncertainty of prosecuting an individual who is either 
state-affiliated or legitimately operating as a rogue agent.  
Not only are militaries researching the applications of nanotechnology to 
warfare, but some of this work is outsourced to universities and companies.  
                                                                                                                                                       
 59 Pinson, supra note 39, at 284; see also Rudy Baum, Nanotechnology: Drexler and 
Smalley Make the Case for and Against ‘Molecular Assemblers,’ CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING 
NEWS, Dec. 1, 2003, at 37 (“My proposal is, and always has been to guide the chemical 
synthesis of complex structures by mechanically positioning reactive molecules, not by 
manipulating individual atoms.  This proposal has been defended successfully again and 
again.”). 
 60 Zhou, supra note 1, at 483. 
 61 Pinson, supra note 39, at 285. 
 62 Id. at 285–86. 
 63 Tarasov, supra note 6, at 338. 
 64 Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5, at 29; Meg McGinity Shannon, Nanotechnology’s Shadow, 
48 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 21 (2005) (discussing progression from individual 
nanoparticles to assemblers of nanoparticles to “productive nanosystems”). 
 65 Zhou, supra note 1, at 483. 
 66 Id. 
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For example, the United States military is working with the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology to determine applications of nanotechnology across a 
spectrum of uses in warfare.67   
Universities are not the only private entities that already have access to 
advanced nanotechnology.  Corporations and individuals account for over 
75% of United States medical nanotechnology patents.68  The numbers are 
similar in other major areas of patent grants.69  Nanotechnology is therefore 
progressively owned by a more wide-ranging group of people.  The 
increasing private ownership of the technology creates further avenues 
through which a malevolent actor could gain control of nanoscience and 
weaponize it—if more corporations, scientists, and universities have the 
technical schematics and equipment necessary to create nanoparticles, the 
pace of its proliferation will likely increase. 
III.  INEFFECTIVE ALTERNATE MEANS OF REGULATION OR DETERRENCE  
Current nanotechnology regulation leaves much to be desired.  It is highly 
questionable whether existing regulations could prevent rogue leaders, states, 
or other groups from deploying either nanoparticles or nano-robots in an 
intentionally destructive manner.  
A.  Current Regulation of Research, Development, and Other Peaceful Uses 
Current regulation is almost entirely national in nature, rather than 
international.70  Such regimes might incentivize responsible development of 
nanotechnology among corporate or research-based actors, because some 
regulatory frameworks on the national level do provide for penalties for 
malfeasance.71  However, if the concern is malfeasance by a nation, or an 
actor with enough influence on a national level to enjoy de facto control, 
then regulations on the national level would prove ineffective.  What 
                                                                                                                                                       
 67 Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5, at 26.  MIT and the U.S. military collaborate through the 
Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies and are researching nanotechnology’s relevance to 
“protection; injury intervention and cure; and human performance improvement.”  Id. 
 68 Mouttet, supra note 26, at 314. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Diana M. Bowman & Graeme A. Hodge, A Small Matter of Regulation: An International 
Review of Nanotechnology Regulation, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006); Rick 
DelVecchio, Berkeley Considering Need for Nano Safety, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 24, 2006, at A1 
(detailing a proposed local Berkeley regulation that would limit the production of 
nanomaterials until they could be more adequately studied.  The town did not feel that even 
American regulations as the national level were protecting them sufficiently from industrial 
interests.). 
 71 Bowman & Hodge, supra note 70, at 30. 
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international guidelines that do exist are exactly that—guidelines.72  These 
guidelines offer prescriptive goals for what an ideal future of nanotechnology 
would look like.73  However, they do not have the regulatory muscle or the 
threat of real sanctions so they do not truly shape the evolution of the 
technology or convince actors to alter their behavior in its deployment.74 
On the national level, regulations that offer any meaningful guidance to 
nanotechnology innovators do not always recognize nanotechnology as a 
new field with unique challenges.  As noted earlier, nanoparticles are 
fundamentally unstable because of their size.75  They behave in ways that 
similar chemicals do not because unpredictable principles of quantum 
mechanics dictate how these particles move and interact with the 
environment around them.76   
Case studies show that nations do not appreciate these distinctively 
unpredictable qualities.77  For example, the current chemical regulatory 
scheme in the United Kingdom is tasked with governing nanotechnology but 
remains fundamentally chemical in nature.78  These regulations address 
chemicals of the same type equally, even if one of these chemicals has a 
unique nanostructure and could behave unpredictably.79  Laws in Australia, 
Japan, and the United States compound these problems; chemical regulations 
focus on “new chemicals.”80  Many novel nanoparticles are not defined as 
“new chemicals,” and so the existing chemical regulations tasked with 
controlling them do not govern them nor have any jurisdiction over their 
deployment.81  Nations seem unwilling to acknowledge the severe 
deficiencies in their regulatory frameworks.  For example, the United States’ 
various regulatory agencies have made it clear that they do not believe that 
nano-specific regulations are necessary.82  This belief may be based on an 
unwillingness or inability to delve into the scientific complexity inherent to 
nanotechnology.83 
Most regulations aim to prevent the misuse of non-reproductive 
nanoparticles and do not address the threat of self-replicating or self-
                                                                                                                                                       
 72 Id. at 45. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Valverde & Linkov, supra note 47, at 30. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See Bowman & Hodge, supra note 70 (discussing bureaucratic unwillingness to confront 
differences between nanotechnology and conventional chemicals). 
 78 Id. at 17. 
 79 Valverde & Linkov, supra note 47, at 31. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Bowman & Hodge, supra note 70, at 19. 
 83 Valverde & Linkov, supra note 47, at 34. 
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assembling nanorobots.84  Although these technologies are not yet available, 
their very nature would make the current chemical-based regulatory structure 
obsolete because they share traits like self-replication with biological agents 
rather than chemical ones.  Even for peaceful technology created in good 
faith, current regulation is insufficient and misguided. 
B.  Inadequate Alternate Theories for Regulating Weaponized 
Nanotechnology 
Regulating nanoparticles as biologically lethal agents presents one of the 
first potential opportunities to bring nanotechnology under the general 
purview of weaponry and warfare-based treaties.  Redefining popular 
conception of nanoparticles from mechanical technology to a biological-style 
agent would give international groups a coherent reason to impose strong 
international regulations.  It would also entail an acknowledgement that the 
technology can be used for intentional destruction.  Much of the current state 
of regulation seems to focus on preventing accidents in the development of 
otherwise well-intentioned products.85  Viewing nanotechnology in the same 
light as biological weapons would also give a framework for punishing 
intentionally-created nanoweapons. 
However, regulating these nanoparticles and nanorobots as biological 
entities also presents challenges.  Robert Pinson points out many of the 
difficulties that would emerge from such a regulatory regime.  He theorizes 
that the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) might have standing to 
govern nanotechnology.86  The United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R. 
ratified the BWC in 1972.87  It bans the development or deployment of 
biological agents for weaponry, and crucially for nanotechnology 
governance, prohibits toxins, “regardless of their properties.”88  The 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which went into effect in April 
1997, also prohibits the deployment of “toxic chemicals and their 
                                                                                                                                                       
 84 See Oak Ridge Nat’l Lab., supra note 3 (discussing current nanotechnology research); 
Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5 (discussing current failure to adequately regulate nanoparticulate 
weapons and exposing the lack of forward-thinking nanotechnology governance); Bowman & 
Hodge, supra note 70, at 31 (discussing regulations that address only nanoparticles and do not 
even acknowledge them as chemically unique). 
 85 See Bowman & Hodge, supra note 70, at 31 (explaining that nanotechnology currently 
falls under chemical regulatory regimes that govern industrial business, as “the 
commercialisation of products containing manufactured nano-particles continues to escalate”). 
 86 See Pinson, supra note 39 (pointing out the physical similarities between the adverse 
effects of inhaled or ingested nanoparticles and those of more traditional weaponized 
biological agents that the BWC clearly has jurisdiction to regulate). 
 87 Id. at 291. 
 88 Id. at 293. 
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precursors.”89  Given the consequences that nanoparticles, such as carbon 
nanotubes, can impose on human physiology, they might conceivably be 
brought under the purview of the Convention. 
Nanotechnology varies so greatly in its applications and effects that it 
may not fit within the definitions in the Biological and Chemical Weapons 
Conventions.90  The drafters of the BWC and CWC intentionally kept the 
definition of “toxin” vague so that new technologies would not be excluded 
from regulation.91  The current evolutionary path of nanotechnology, 
however, may become so divergent that it could no longer qualify as a 
toxin.92  The BWC also prohibits more conventional, pathogen-based 
weaponry.  It is questionable, however, if the BWC covers even replicator 
nanorobots, because it requires that the regulated quantity be “alive.”93  Man-
made robots probably would not enter BWC jurisdiction, even if they 
behaved similarly to traditional pathogens.94 
Indeed, modern regulatory frameworks are likely insufficient to deal with 
any intentional deployment of nanotechnology in a wartime setting.  The 
field of nanotechnology could produce weapons that “span several traditional 
technological compartments and blur the distinction between conventional 
weapons and weapons of mass destruction.”95  The kind of biological 
dangers mentioned earlier are merely one example of this blurred line—the 
idea of self-replicating robots would theoretically allow a relatively small 
weapon to affect a disproportionately large area.  Other weapons, with the 
exception of prohibited biological agents, are not noted for reproducing 
themselves after their deployment.96  Not only does this ability to reproduce 
and continue causing damage distinguish nanorobots from traditional 
weapons, it distinguishes them from nuclear and chemical weapons as well. 
The current substitute for a true international framework regulates 
nanotechnology from the edges rather than addressing it head-on.  There is 
                                                                                                                                                       
 89 Id. at 294. 
 90 Id. at 298. 
 91 Id. at 292. 
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 96 See generally Nuclear Weapons: How They Work, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 
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no current international treaty that regulates weaponized nanotechnology.97  
The most applicable current regulations ban or present guidelines on general 
technologies or delivery vehicles such as “expanding bullets, asphyxiating, 
poisonous or other gases, biological weapons, chemical weapons, blinding 
laser weapons, anti-personnel mines, and most recently, cluster munitions.”98  
While these bans may remove some nanotechnology from the battlefield, the 
prevention will be incomplete.  Some nanotechnology could be used to 
produce or augment these weapons, and even directly weaponized 
nanorobots or nanoparticles could be delivered via delivery vehicles that 
violate treaties.99  However, nanotechnology is evolving into a field 
increasingly distinct from the sciences that influence traditional weapons 
production.100  Because of this divergence, regulations on current weapons 
technologies likely will not accurately encompass future weaponized 
nanotechnology. 
Pre-emptively developing a comprehensive international approach to 
intentionally weaponized nanotechnology is important because the 
technology’s deployment would likely be deliberately calculated to inflict 
maximum damage.  An industrial accident, on the other hand, might be 
limited and would likely fall within the scope of a nation’s individual 
regulations.101  Some scholars believe that even in the private research realm, 
significant regulations will not be enacted until there is a disaster to prompt 
them.102  These scholars believe that such a disaster and the resulting 
regulation are probably “inevitable,”103 but have publically resigned 
themselves to that inevitability.  However, the “luxury” of waiting for an 
industrial accident does not exist in the wartime context.   
The amorphous nature of nanotechnology presents problems even beyond 
the classification of weapons as conventional or weapons of mass 
destruction.  One of the most prominent of these concerns is the ability of 
nanotechnology to alter body chemistry.104  Nasu speculates that nano-
medicine may be used on a country’s own soldiers in a future war to enhance 
their physical capabilities, but with significant long-term harm to the 
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2013] REGULATING WEAPONIZED NANOTECHNOLOGY  737 
 
soldiers.105  A regulatory regime must therefore encompass not only the acts 
of a rogue actor with access to nanotechnology and those of a state deploying 
nanotechnology against enemy combatants, but also those of a state turning 
these technologies on its own citizens. 
Current regimes of common law within the international community also 
will be insufficient to address concerns of evolving nanotechnology.  These 
definitions largely center on the differences between the intent behind 
actions and the consequences of those same actions.106  In the case of some 
nanotechnology, this chasm could be far wider than with any other kind of 
weapons technology.107  Further statutes hinge on the definition of 
“suffering,” which retains an amorphous definition in international law.108  
Beyond this amorphous definition, there is uncertainty as to whether 
weaponized nanotechnology would cause “unnecessary” and “superfluous” 
damage.  If the damage were defined as such, then international common law 
would be implicated, but otherwise, there would be little recourse within the 
international common law.109   
Finally, preemptively shutting off the spigot of nanotechnology-based 
weapons may be nearly impossible without the catastrophe that Bowman & 
Hodge allude to110 because nations will be unwilling to submit to 
nanotechnology regulations that preemptively deter weapons development.111  
The proscriptive measures currently available do not sufficiently deter states 
from weapon development given the powerful financial incentives favoring 
weapon development;112 asking states to submit to pre-emptive checks of 
nascent technology with great economic potential is quixotic at best.113 
C.  Ineffectiveness of Purely National Solutions 
The international nature of nanotechnology development presents unique 
problems for avoiding its weaponization.  As previously mentioned, at least 
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five militaries are aggressively pursuing nanotechnological advantages.114  
Thus, a single country’s regulation or goodwill can prevent the misuse of the 
technology.  Countries also have different ideas of what constitutes proper 
regulation of science;115 therefore, there may be different cultural ideas of 
how far weapons research could ethically proceed.   
If the international community waits to enact these enforcements until 
nanotechnology is deployed in an international conflict, the consequences 
may be far worse for two reasons.  First, the technology has shown enough 
destructive potential that an intentionally combative use of it could easily 
exceed the consequences of an industrial accident.116  Second, it would be 
difficult to regulate this technology during an actual conflict because of the 
incentives of war and the uncertainties of classifying nanotechnology.  
Warfare naturally pits state actors against each other.  Because nations at war 
are fighting for their own survival in a zero-sum game, Bowman and 
Hodge’s proposed regulations on the national level are unlikely to 
succeed.117  If a nation can gain a competitive advantage by suspending its 
own national policies, there may be an incentive to do so.  As for the current 
international regulations that govern delivery vehicles and present 
technologies, nanotechnology is becoming increasingly difficult to define 
because of its unique properties.118  A coherent international voice would 
clarify the acceptability of these new technologies.  For example, there is 
currently debate about whether the DIME system that Israel recently 
deployed against the Palestinians violates international weapons treaties 
because it bears some similarities to banned chemical weapons; however, 
there is no body to issue a definitive international ruling on the subject.119 
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Non-military research can also carry military implications.  Japan is one 
of the largest researchers of nanotechnology in the world; lagging behind the 
United States in patents granted but leading in patents applications.120  Japan 
has identified nanotechnology as an area of research focus and has invested 
the equivalent of several hundred million dollars in development as part of 
its Second Science and Technology Basic Plan.121  Japan significantly lags 
behind other nations, including the United States, in the perception that the 
ethical issues surrounding nanotechnology are worthy of research and 
funding.122  This lack of concern mirrors other casual attitudes towards safety 
in the Japanese research community; for example, the nation trails the United 
States in bioethics as a field.123  That casual attitude is particularly troubling 
because scientists have already identified specific biological risks from 
current nanotechnology.124  It is also generally troubling, because 
nanotechnology is an increasingly powerful force and the world does not 
have a coherent or cohesive attitude towards its dangers and regulation. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Because of the current state of regulation, it will be necessary to articulate 
and implement structures for regulating nanotechnology as a weapon and not 
just as a new research technology.  Current weapons regulations are at best 
inadequate and contain too many contradictions and ambiguities to function 
effectively.  The International Criminal Court (ICC), while imperfect, is 
currently the best solution for such regulation.  The ICC already exists and 
would not require the adoption of a new set of international treaties.  Its 
charter seeks to prevent acts of large-scale destruction and crimes against 
humanity.  This large-scale frame of reference is appropriate because one of 
the more serious effects of weaponized biotech could be biological 
                                                                                                                                                       
 120 Escoffier, supra note 11, at 104. 
 121 Id. at 103. 
 122 Matsuda & Hunt, supra note 50, at 261. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Carbon Nanotube Asbestos Dangers, supra note 116; Nanotubes Highly Toxic, 
INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE IN SOCIETY (Nov. 18, 2003), http://www.i-sis.org.uk/nanotubestoxic. 
php (“Under the microscope, the lungs of dead animals in the high dose group showed large 
aggregates of particles in macrophages (large white blood cells that ‘eat’ foreign particles) in 
the alveolar space (air sac), some of the aggregates were also found in spaces between cells, 
forming granulomas (tumour-like nodules consisting of the bloated white blood cells).  There 
were also signs of inflammation.  Granulomas were not detected in mice given the low dose of 
the nickel-yttrium nanotubes.  The lungs of mice given high dose of either raw or purified 
iron-containing nanotubes showed prominent granulomas at 7 days.”). 
740  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 41:723 
 
warfare.125  Additionally, the ICC can target both elected state actors and 
private but prominent actors within states for their crimes.  
A.  The International Criminal Court 
The ICC is an international body designed to punish “serious crimes of 
concern to the international community.”126  The Court was established in 
response to the African and Yugoslavian atrocities in the 1990s, after 
international consensus that a permanent body was necessary.127  The signers 
of the Rome Statute, which established the Court, believed that it should be 
an independent court based on an international treaty.128  Though the crimes 
of the mid-1990s were the crucial catalyst for the ICC’s formation, the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials are also considered predecessors to the Court, 
and they addressed many of the same issues that the ICC faces today.129 
The ICC prosecutes large-scale crimes, the main causes of action being 
genocide, crimes against humanity, aggression, and war crimes.130  Scholars 
fear weaponized nanotechnology because in several years or decades, it 
could cause catastrophic damage that currently only weapons of mass 
destruction can.131  Because these crimes could threaten broad populations,132 
they fit within the general scope of ICC prosecutions.  After prosecuting 
African genocides,133 the ICC would likely have more gravitas and 
institutional capability to deal with crimes of the magnitude that weaponized 
nanotechnology could facilitate. 
The most straightforward path by which the ICC could prosecute 
weaponized nanotechnology is by incorporating the technology into its 
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definition of the crime of aggression.  Article 5 of the Rome Treaty 
recognizes a crime of aggression as one of the four major crimes that the ICC 
should prosecute.134  However, the crime is not currently under the effective 
jurisdiction of the ICC.135  The Rome Treaty delayed including an official 
definition, opting instead to incorporate the crime later.136  The Treaty did 
not establish an official definition of the crime of aggression in time to 
incorporate it into the established war crimes, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity jurisdictions that were already codified within.137   
The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression was formed to 
define the crime of aggression.138  This group’s task is to define the crime of 
aggression.139  They are still refining these definitions and will not have an 
enforceable definition until 2017.140  Because this definition is still being 
refined and modified, it could incorporate emerging areas of public policy 
without challenging the legitimacy of the Rome Treaty.  It is therefore ideal 
for addressing nanotechnology-specific difficulties.141  
The first article in their working proposition states that  
For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in 
a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the 
political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression 
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.142 
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The rest of the recommendation attempts to define the crime of 
aggression in more specific terms.143  These terms seem almost universally to 
apply to the movement of land-based or naval-based armies against a rival 
state power.144  The recommendations (though current) spend little time 
addressing or considering the implications of modern technological power 
and its destructive effect on the broad-based civilian structures within 
societies.145  The Working Group’s recommendations seem keyed towards 
re-fighting the wars of the early twentieth century—they explicitly prohibit 
many uses of overt land warfare while ignoring current projection of 
nonconventional force.146 
The crime of aggression’s current definition omits language that could 
regulate nanotechnology.  First, the ICC’s promise is that it can potentially 
offer prosecutions against both official state actions and de facto state actions 
(or those undertaken by powerful interests within a country that still do not 
technically possess state power).147  The current draft of the crime of 
aggression “distinguishes between the ‘act of aggression’ (what a state does) 
and the ‘crime of aggression’ (what a leader does).”148  This gap addresses 
the difference between an actual national act of aggression against another 
state and the planning, initiation, and execution of such an act by the 
country’s political leadership.149  This gap in prosecutorial authority could 
severely hinder any number of decentralized crimes.  Ophardt addresses the 
potential jurisdictional gap in terms of cyber warfare, but the gap applies 
equally to nanotechnology governance.  Fundamentally, the current ICC 
theories on aggression rely on “traditional concepts of territorial integrity.”150  
While this current definition might be insufficient, the regulation of 
aggression might prove more useful than initially imagined. 
The apparent leadership gap in the ICC definitions of aggression could 
also cut in favor of some forms of nanotechnology regulation.  Aggression is 
a “leadership” crime,151 and charges can be brought not only against actual 
political leaders, but also those in a position to induce or influence significant 
policy changes within a state.152  It is therefore more likely that influential 
scientists and technicians could be held to account for their influence in the 
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development of nanoweapons.153  This flexibility of the Court could also help 
weak governments confront private developers of military nanotechnology 
within their borders.  The ICC can either pursue cases proprio motu or based 
on a “referral from any State Party.”154 
In addition, the crime of aggression could include a provision for 
attempted aggression, even though some scholars currently see this as 
unlikely.155  Article 25 of the Rome Treaty contains the general attempt 
provision, and there was argument as to whether it should apply in the case 
of state aggression.156  Attempted aggression may allow for preemptive 
regulations against weaponized nanotech.  The ICC generally has jurisdiction 
over attempted crimes if other jurisdictional requirements are met; it is not 
completely clear from the Special Working Group’s drafting process whether 
the ability to prosecute for the crime of aggression would fall within the 
attempt framework.157  While Clark hypothesizes that obvious cases of 
attempt would be justiciable under the ICC, it is possible that the regulations 
on attempt would curtail the research activities of weapons scientists. 
Further avenues of attack against nontraditional actors are enumerated 
throughout ICC regulations.  For example, there is a regulation against 
“[a]llowing an attack by a State to originate from its sovereign territory,” 
which “is also considered an act of aggression.”158  Ophardt speculates that 
the breadth of this definition could allow the ICC flexibility in legitimately 
prosecuting nations that harbor non-state groups within their borders and 
                                                                                                                                                       
 153 Cf. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali 
Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision on 6 Applications for 
Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings (May 17, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/ 
icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc%20 
0205%200107/Pages/darfur_%20Sudan.aspx [hereinafter Sudan Cases]; Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 133.  The ICC is currently prosecuting both the former 
Minister of State for Sudan and the founder of a powerful insurgent army within the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.  Id.; Sudan Cases, supra. 
 154 Situations and Cases, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_men 
us/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited Mar. 
31, 2013). 
 155 The Proposal, supra note 139.  The Proposal currently proposes punishing “the planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression.”  Id. § 1. 
 156 Clark, supra note 134, at 1108–09.  Clark, however, believes that the more likely 
scenario is that a “bizarre case” that merits a charge of attempted aggression would be “left for 
judicial resolution.” Id. at 1109; see also Claus Kreβ, Time for Decision: Some Thoughts on 
the Immediate Future of the Crime of Aggression: A Reply to Andreas Paulus, 20 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 1129, 1135 n.24 (2009) (asserting that as currently worded, the proposed crime of 
aggression would not support a prosecution for attempted aggression). 
 157 Clark, supra note 134, at 1109. 
 158 Ophardt, supra note 141, at 50. 
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allow them to develop weaponized nanotechnology.159  The functional 
predecessors of the ICC160 also zealously prosecuted non-state actors for 
their complicity in human rights violations; the Nuremburg prosecutions 
included actions against those who financed the Nazi regime on the theory 
that their actions had enabled the atrocities that followed.161   
The International Criminal Court’s charter allows for prosecutions against 
states that commit crimes of aggression or leaders that commit crimes against 
humanity.162  It contains multiple other avenues for theoretically attacking 
unorthodox and technically advanced crimes that can originate from either 
state or non-state impetuses.163  And, it is an established body that actually 
has the mechanisms to try cases.164  Other proposals for the creation of new 
bodies to regulate only nanotechnology do not acknowledge these realities.165  
The risks from intentionally weaponized nanotechnology are too great and 
too pressing to entrust to radically new legal provisions that are untested. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Nanotechnology promises rapid advancement to many areas of science.  
In the next decades, it may dramatically improve surgical techniques, 
durability of goods, and industrial processes.166  There are many reasons to 
embrace the development of the technology.  However, the unknowns 
surrounding nanotechnology affirm that the embrace should be cautious.  
Nanoparticles can have unpredictable and adverse effects on organisms,167 
and nanorobots could deal a crippling blow to a nation or business’s 
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technology infrastructure if they achieve the ability to replicate 
themselves.168 
Current methods of punishing the intentional misuse of nanotechnology 
are inadequate.  The common law includes elements for war crimes that do 
not apply to nanotechnology.169  Nanoparticles do not closely enough 
resemble biological or chemical agents to fall under the Biological Weapons 
Convention or the Chemical Weapons Convention.170  Current international 
treaties regarding delivery vehicles and other traditional weapons will not 
capture the future evolution of nanotech.171  And nations cannot be relied 
upon to regulate their own military technology in a time of war. 
The International Criminal Court already exists.172  It has prosecutors, and 
it has a defined power structure.173  The ICC has prosecuted crimes across 
the globe,174 so its reach is not in question.  The ICC is designed to account 
for actions that affect broad swaths of people175 like researchers speculate an 
advanced nanoweapon would.176  Finally, the Special Working Group is still 
defining the crime of aggression,177 so definitions specifically condemning 
the evils of weaponized nanotech could be plugged relatively seamlessly into 
the broad Rome Statute framework. 
Before the military conflicts of the upcoming years and decades, nations 
should unequivocally state that nanotechnology has no place as a weapon.  
Its potential effects invoke our deepest fears.  Properly weaponized, it could 
kill numbers of people that society currently believes only weapons of mass 
destruction can.178  The international community should demonstrate the 
international criminal consequences that will accompany the deployment of 
such a technology.  The ICC is the best option for accomplishing such 
regulation and deterrence. 
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